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COMMENTS
Intra-Entity Conspiracies and Section I of
the Sherman Act: Filling the "Gap" after
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.
INTRODUCTION
S ection I of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits and declares
unlawful "[e]very contract, combination,. . . or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States."' The
Supreme Court has interpreted this section as sanctioning the con-
certed action of two or more firms or entities that unreasonably
restricts trade or competition.' The conduct of a single corpora-
tion or other business unit is almost exclusively exempted from
application of this provision, primarily because most courts have
held that the actions of a single firm lack the "plurality of actors"
necessary to a finding of contract, combination or conspiracy; in
essence, the courts have refused to recognize intra-corporate
conspiracies.?
1. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
2. See, e.g., Theatre Entertainment, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537 (1954); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel'Co., 85 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
3. See, e.g., Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 677 F.2d 946, 953 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1007 (1982); Tose v. First Pa. Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879, 893-94 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Card v. National Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828 (10th
Cir. 1979); H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978);
Morton Bldgs. of Neb., Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 531 F.2d 910, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1976);
Poller v. CBS, 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962);
Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); Ray v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 430 F. Supp. 1353
(W.D.N.C. 1977); Carlo C. Gelardi Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 421 F. Supp. 237 (D.N.J.
1976).
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There was, however, a well recognized exception to this gen-
eral rule-the so-called intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.4 Ba-
sically the doctrine provided that where two entities were sepa-
rately incorporated, common ownership or control would not
excuse them from liability for conduct in violation of section 1.5
Thus, while the coordinated acts of a corporation and its unincor-
porated subdivisions were outside the breadth of section 1 due to
the judiciary's treatment of intra-corporate conspiracy,' the iden-
tical conduct of a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidi-
aries remained subject to the prohibitions of this section under
the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. As many lower courts7
and scholars8 have commented, this led to an artificial distinction
4. The term "intra-enterprise conspiracy" has traditionally been used to refer to al-
leged conspiracies between closely affiliated but separately incorporated firms. For example
parent/subsidiary dealings are included within this term, as are those cases in which the
two corporations are subject to common ownership or control by a third party. "Intra-
corporate conspiracies," on the other hand, refer to those situations where the alleged
conspirators are members of the same legal entity-i.e., officers or employees of a single
corporation, or its unincorporated divisions.
As used in this Comment, the term "intra-entity conspiracy" is used to denote conspir-
acy within a single economic, rather than legal, unit and as such encompasses both the
"intra-enterprise" and "intra-corporate" notions of conspiracy, as well as all other situa-
tions featuring conspirators who are members of the same economic group.
5. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). The doc-
trine is derived from the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332
U.S. 218, 227-28 (1947).
6. See, e.g., H. & B. Equipment Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244
(5th Cir. 1978); Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1969);
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 83-84 (9th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Poller v. CBS, 284 F.2d 599, 603 (D.C. Cir.
1960), rev'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
7. See, e.g., Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 317-18
(7th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984); Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 588
(8th Cir. 1981); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.,
508 F.2d 547, 557 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
8. See, e.g., Areeda, Intraenterprise Conspiracy in Decline, 97 HARV. L. Rav. 451 (1983);
Barndt, Two Trees or One?-The Problem of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 23 MONT. L, REv. 158
(1962); Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass-Twenty-First Annual Antitrust Review,
57 CAIF. L. REv. 182 (1969); Handler & Smart, The Present Status of the Intracorporate Con-
spiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. Ray. 23 (1981); Kempf, Bathtub Conspiracies: Has Seagram
Distilled a More Potent Brew?, 24 Bus. LAW. 173 (1968); McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate
Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. REv. 183 (1955); Stengel, Intra-Enter-
prise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 35 Miss. L. J. 5 (1963); Willis & Pitofsky,
Antitrust Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 20 (1968); Comment,
Interaenterprise Antitrust Conspiracy: A Decisionmaking Approach, 71 CALF. L. Rv. 1732
(1983); Comment, All in the Family: When Will Internal Discussions Be Labeled Intra-Enterprise
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in the application of the antitrust laws based solely on the form of
incorporation, rather than upon any relevant substantive con-
cerns. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,9 the Su-
preme Court rejected the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
The Court held that for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the actions of a single enterprise (i.e., affiliated corporations
in which a parent owns 100% of its subsidiary's stock) are now
exempt.10 Individual actors within such a corporate structure are
said to have complete "unity of purpose or a common design;" '
when acting "alone," this entity fails, as a matter of law, to satisfy
the plurality of actors required to establish a conspiracy in viola-
tion of section 1.
There are, however, certain situations in which "unilateral"
action results in activity that could otherwise be classified as an
unreasonable restraint of trade.1 In many instances a single entity
can inhibit free trade and competition as effectively as two firms
acting in concert.13 Yet, because the courts have declined to rec-
ognize intra-entity conspiracies, single entity action has been
placed beyond the reach of section 1.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, in contrast, imposes sanctions
Conspiracy? 14 DuQ. L. REv. 63 (1975); Comment, Corporate Liability for Intra-Corporate Con-
spiracy in Restraint of Trade, 1968 U. Imi L. F. 248 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Corporate
Liability]; Note, "Conspiring Entities" Under Section I of the Sherman Act, 95 HARv. L. REv.
661 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Conspiring Entities]; Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy
Under Section I of the Sherman Act: A Suggested Standard, 75 Mic. L. REv. 717 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy].
9. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). Chief Justice Burger authored the majority opinion while
Mr. Justice Stevens was joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall in his dis-
sent. Mr. Justice White did not participate.
10. The Copperweld decision expressly limits its holding to the situation where the sub-
sidiary is wholly owned. See id. at 2740. The obvious question then arises as to how a case
will be treated in which the subsidiary is less than wholly owned. For a discussion of this
question, see infra note 73.
Two recent circuit court decisions have extended the Copperweld rationale to situations
presenting slightly different corporate structures. In Hood v. Tenneco Tex. Life Ins. Co.,
739 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit relied upon Copperweld in concluding that
two wholly owned subsidiaries of a common parent were incapable of conspiring for pur-
poses of section 1. In Century Oil Tool, Inc., v. Production Specialties, Inc., 737 F.2d 1316
(5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit found that two corporations under common ownership
and control by three individual shareholders were also incapable of conspiring in violation
of section 1.
11. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2742.
12. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
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against a person who monopolizes or attempts to monopolize any
part of trade or commerce. 14 It also prohibits combinations or
conspiracies which monopolize or attempt to monopolize any part
of trade or commerce. This section is thus said to reach both uni-
lateral and concerted activity. While monopolization of a particu-
lar market or industry is a "restraint of trade or commerce" in
the broader sense15 it usually implies activities by a firm with a
substantial market share which evince intentional misuse or ac-
cumulation of market power.1 " A restraint of trade under section
1, on the other hand, may have a somewhat more limited impact
on overall market conditions.
1 7
The current practice, then, of excluding the conduct of single
firms and enterprises from the scope of section 1, leaves a signifi-
cant "gap" in Sherman Act coverage. 8 This "gap" is defined by
single entity conduct which unreasonably restrains trade or com-
merce, but which does not amount to monopolization or attempts
to monopolize under section 2.
The question addressed by this Comment is whether or not
single firm or enterprise activity should, as a matter of law, be
excluded from scrutiny under section 1. This Comment will argue
that neither single firm nor single enterprise activity should be per
se excluded from prosecution under the Act. Rather, such con-
14. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
15. Cf Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Justice Holmes seems to suggest that monopolization (or an attempt to monop-
olize) is a single firm restraint of trade or competition because it is aimed at outsiders, and
is the same or equal to two firms combining to restrain trade or competition between them.
See id. at 405-06.
16. A claim of monopolization under § 2 generally requires proof of two elements: (1)
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market; and (2) intentional acquisition or
protection of that power unassociated with a superior product or business acumen. In re
Municipal Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 1982). In turn
"[mlonopoly power means the ability to affect or control the price and output of a given
product in a certain product market." Comment, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp.: Has the Supreme Court Pulled the Plug on the "Bathtub Conspiracy"?, 18 Lov. L.A.L.
REv. 857, 861-62 n.26 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Has the Supreme Court Pulled
the Plug]. See generally P. AREEDA, ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS 146-237 (3d. ed. 1981).
17. Proof of a violation under Section 1 requires establishment of the following ele-
ments: (1) a contract, combination or conspiracy; that (2) unreasonably restrains trade; and
(3) is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce. SECTION ON ANTrrausT LAW, ABA, ANTI-
Tusr LAW DEVELOPMENTs 2 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as ABA].
18. The Supreme Court in Copperwveld acknowledges that this "gap" exists, but argues
that it is the result of deliberate congressional action. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2744. See
infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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duct should be subject to examination on its merits, and judged by
application of the rule of reason. 9
Part I briefly explores the underlying purpose and aim of the
Sherman Act, and some of the policies embraced therein. Part II
presents the Supreme Court's decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Inde-
pendence Tube Corp. with a critique of the majority and dissenting
opinions. Part III considers the issue of intra-corporate conspiracy
and further examines the arguments for the intra-entity exemp-
tions raised in the Copperweld decision. Finally, Part IV presents a
suggested analysis that would include "unilateral" activity within
the realm of section 1.
I. PURPOSES OF THE SHERMAN ACT
The initial bills, reports and debates in Congress which led
to the birth of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 reflected the
changing social, political and economic conditions that existed in
the United States, and indeed the world. 0 The industrial revolu-
tion had reached maturity, and large scale corporate capitalism
had solidified its reign over the American business scene. Because
of the government's laissez-faire policies, large firms had been
able to amass tremendous economic power and market control.2 1
These firms used their ingenuity and influence to thwart competi-
tion in their respective industries and to manipulate markets,
thereby increasing their own wealth and power at the expense of
consumers and smaller businesses.
19. Other commentators have also embraced this or a similar point of view. See, e.g.,
Barndt, supra note 8, at 199 ("the permissible course of conduct for any corporation
should be determined by an evaluation of the nature of the undertaking itself. . .. [apply-
ing] the 'rule of reason' concept" (footnote omitted)); Kramer, Does Concerted Action Solely
Between a Corporation and its Officers Acting on its Behalf in Unreasonable Restraint of Interstate
Commerce Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act?, 11 FED. Bus. J. 130, 142 (1951) (any exception
of conduct from section 1 "should be founded upon the conclusion that the restraint is not,
as a matter of economics, 'substantial' or 'unreasonable' ").
20. Following the Civil War, tremendous economic changes swept America. Rapid in-
dustrialization, market expansion and technological development gave birth to a complex
and diversified economy. Many societal and political changes followed. See generally C.
BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIc HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 274-303 (1968).
21. 1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTrrRUST LAW 126 (1980).
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A. The Theory of Free Competition
Free competition has been shown, in theory, to be the most
efficient method of allocating resources. 2 In a perfectly competi-
tive economy, individuals' material satisfaction is maximized in the
aggregate by means of the price mechanism. Market forces inter-
act to determine the price and quantity for a particular good. Sell-
ers produce to the point where the marginal cost for producing
another unit is equal to the price consumers are willing to pay for
that unit.23 Where this equilibrium exists, firms realize only a
"normal" profit, which represents a normal rate of return on
their investment.
2 4
The perfectly competitive economy is characterized by free,
unimpaired access to market opportunity-i.e., no barriers to en-
try2 - - and by an efficient allocation of economic resources.2 0
In contrast, where free trade or competition is inhibited, im-
perfect competition exists. Prices for the affected goods or ser-
vices would then be higher than "perfectly competitive" prices,
while the quantities produced would be less than optimal.2 This is
because a firm in an imperfectly competitive market desires to
produce at a price and quantity in which its marginal cost is equal
to its marginal revenue; however, since its marginal revenue is
usually significantly below the price consumers are willing to
pay, 2 8 the resulting market equilibrium price creates excess or
"monopoly" profits for the firm. 9
Further, imperfect competition that is created by the actions
of market participants is usually characterized by barriers to entry
which deter or even entirely eliminate access to market opportu-
nity, thereby fostering an inefficient allocation of economic
22. See Johnson & Ferrill, Defining Competition: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Decision-
making, 36 BAYLOR L. Rav. 583, 591 (1984).
For a general introduction and explanation of the principles of welfare economics, see
P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, ECONoMics 482-88, 517-20 (12th ed. 1985). For a more
specific discussion of competition and monopoly, see P. AREEDA, supra note 16, at 7-43.
23. P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAU.S, supra note 22, at 485-86.
24. See id. at 516-17.
25. See Johnson & Ferrill, supra note 22, at 587.
26. See id. at 590-91.
27. See P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 22, at 518-19.
28. See id. at 516. Marginal revenue is less than the price consumers are willing to pay
because the firm has the power to affect the market price through its production decisions.




The ramifications of a highly imperfect market system are
twofold: First, consistent excess profits represent a shift in the dis-
tribution of wealth within society from consumers to producers;31
producers' overall net worth is increased at the expense of con-
sumers' economic well-being. Second, because an inefficient allo-
cation of resources exists, the economy as a whole suffers to some
degree. This results in a "dead-weight loss" to society, represent-
ing a reduction in overall wealth and material well-being.
3 2
In addition to economic considerations, free competition
presents other, more intrinsic benefits to our society. For instance,
free competition has been viewed as consonant, and even neces-
sary, to our democratic way of life.-3 In markets where there are
large numbers of buyers and sellers, and competitive forces are at
work, income and resources are allocated impersonally and thus
nondiscriminatorily. 4 Further, in competitive settings, economic
power (and resulting political power) tends to be dispersed among
the many, rather than concentrated among the few. 5 Economic
competition can, in this manner, provide a fair and efficient
method of social control. 6
B. Adoption of the Sherman Act
The main concern leading to the enactment of the Sherman
Act, therefore, was the rapid destruction of competitive forces in
national and international markets, and the effect of the resulting
suboptimal market performance on the economic well-being of
the American people. 7 The major aim and purpose of the Act
30. See Johnson & Ferrill, supra note 22, at 592-93.
31. See id. at 593-94.
32. See P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 22, at 518-20.
33. See, e.g., Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (unre-
strained competitive forces provide an environment conducive to the preservation of our
"democratic political and social institutions").
34. Johnson & Ferrill, supra note 22, at 589.
35. See id. at 588-89.
36. See id. at 589.
37.
The sole object of such a combination [trust] is to make competition impossible.
It can control the market, raise or lower prices, as will best promote its selfish
interests, reduce prices in a particular locality and break down competition and
advance prices at will where competition does not exist. . . . The law of selfish-
ness, uncontrolled by competition, compels it to disregard the interest of the
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was to reverse this trend by preserving and protecting economic
competition in interstate and foreign markets."'
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of eco-
nomic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the
rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources,
the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress,
while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preserva-
tion of our democratic political and social institutions. But even were that
premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is
competition.
3
Congress must have recognized, however, the difficulties asso-
ciated with such a formidable undertaking. Novel anticompetitive
schemes were being implemented by business entities at an alarm-
ing rate. The legislators realized that a broad, all encompassing
statute was necessary to ensure effective compliance with their
mandate.4 0 Thus, they enacted the sweeping language of section
consumer ....
They [trusts and other combinations limiting competition] increase beyond
reason the cost of the necessaries of life and business, and they decrease the
cost of the raw material, the farm products of the country. They regulate prices
at their will, depress the price of what they buy and increase the price of what
they sell. They aggregate to themselves great, enormous wealth by extortion
which makes the people poor. Then, making this extorted wealth the means of
further extortion from their unfortunate victims, the people of the United
States, they pursue unmolested, unrestrained by law, their ceaseless round of
peculation under the law, till they are fast producing that condition in our peo-
ple in which the great mass of them are the servitors of those who have this
aggregated wealth at their command.
21 CONG. RE. 2457, 2461 (1890) (statements of Senator Sherman).
38. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951). See also Northern Pac.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) ("the policy unequivocally laid down by the
[Sherman] Act is competition"); REPORT OF THE ArORNEY GENERAL'S NA'L COMMrrrEE
To STUDY THE ANTrrRusT LAws 1 (1955) [hereinafter cited as ATrORNEY GE-NERAL'S RE-
PORT] ("[t]he general objective of the antitrust laws is promotion of competition in open
markets"); I H. ToumN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTTRusT LAws OF THE US. § 4.4, at 96
(1949) (the clear aim and purpose of the Act is: "(1) to protect commerce against unlawful
restraints and monopolies; and (2) to preserve freedom of competition"); Johnson & Ferrill,
supra note 22, at 585 (purpose to "prohibit unreasonable restraints on competition").
39. Northern Pacfic, 356 U.S. at 4-5.
40.
[I]n view of the many new forms of contracts and combinations which were
being evolved from existing economic conditions, it was deemed essential by an
all-embracing enumeration to make sure that no form. . . by which an undue
restraint of interstate or foreign commerce was brought about could save such
restraint from condemnation.
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1: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."' 1
The breadth of this language was intended to bring all forms of
restraint on competition within the Act's prohibitions.,2 "It does
not go into detailed definitions which might either work injury to
legitimate enterprise or, through particularization, defeat its pur-
poses by providing loopholes for escape.'4 The details of the Act
were left to be worked out by the courts." However, judicial in-
terpretation of section 1 has yielded some incongruity in its appli-
cation. A number of these inconsistencies will be developed and
discussed throughout the remainder of this Comment, beginning
with an examination of one of the latest and most significant judi-
cial interpretations of section 1-the Supreme Court's decision in
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.
II. COPPERWELD CORP. V. INDEPENDENCE TUBE CORP.
On June 19, 1984, a divided Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., placing
to rest the controversy and confusion surrounding the intra-enter-
prise conspiracy doctrine. 5 In Copperweld, the Court held that, as
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911). Cf Comment, Antitrust
Law-The Demise of the Intraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrine: Copperweld Corp. v. Indepen-
dence Tube Corp., 10 J. CORP. L. 785, 797-99 (1985) ("[t]he majority's determination that
a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary cannot form a plurality of actors for
purposes of section 1 lacks a basis in legislative history").
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
42. H, THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRusr PoucY 180-85, 220-29 (1955).
43. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933).
Of course, this ambiguity was both intentional and necessary. Given the near-
infinite variety of possible commercial relationships, and the unpredictability of
the consequences of any particular arrangement in a given commercial and eco-
nomic context, a precise statutory enumeration of all lawful and unlawful busi-
ness conduct simply would be impracticable.
Johnson & Ferrill, supra note 22, at 585. See Standard il, 221 U.S. at 59-60.
44. See P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTITRuT LAW § 106, at 15 (1978) (the antitrust
statutes require the federal courts to develop an "antitrust law," much in the manner of
the common law courts).
45.
Prior to Copperweld, problems related to the doctrine were clearly evident: cir-
cuit courts had settled on several conflicting tests for invoking the intraenter-
prise principle; commentators had condemned the concept for decades; and the
Supreme Court had provided little guidance in the area with a scattered line of
ill-defined precedents.
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a matter of law, a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are inca-
pable of conspiring with each other in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.4 The decision equates the acts of a single firm or
corporation and the acts of closely affiliated corporations:47 with
respect to section 1, the anticompetitive conduct of both a single
corporation and of a single business enterprise consisting of re-
lated corporations is thereby exempt, notwithstanding the fact
that identical conduct by two or more unaffiliated firms might
constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade.
A. Facts
In 1955, the Regal Tube Co. was established as a wholly
owned subsidiary of C.E. Robinson Co., and was engaged in the
manufacture of structural steel tubing used in heavy equipment,
cargo vehicles and construction. In 1968, Regal was purchased by
Lear Siegler, Inc., which operated it as an unincorporated divi-
sion. David Grohne, previously vice president and general man-
ager of Regal, became its division president after the purchase. In
1972, Copperweld Corp. purchased the Regal division of Lear
Siegler and transferred its assets to a new, wholly owned Pennsyl-
vania corporation. The sale agreement bound Lear Siegler and its
subsidiaries not to compete with Regal in the United States for
five years. Shortly before Regal's sale to Copperweld, Grohne be-
came an officer of Lear Siegler, and thereafter made plans to es-
tablish his own structural steel tubing business. This new establish-
ment would operate in the same markets as Regal, and thus
directly compete with it. Grohne formed the Independence Tube
Corp. in May 1972, and soon secured an offer from a tubing mill
supplier to have a mill ready by December 1973.
When executives of Regal and Copperweld became aware of
Grohne's plans they consulted counsel. Their attorney informed
them that they could only enjoin Independence's operation if
Grohne had employed technical information or trade secrets be-
longing to Regal. This was because Independence was clearly
outside the scope of the non-competition agreement. Instead of
taking legal action within the scope of their rights, however, Cop-
Comment, Has the Supreme Court Pulled the Plug, supra note 16, at 859.
46. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2745.
47. See id. at 2741-42.
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perweld and Regal contacted potential suppliers, customers and
financiers of Independence, and discouraged them from dealing
with the new firm. A letter stated that Copperweld would be
"greatly concerned if [Grohne] contemplates entering the struc-
tural tube market . . . in competition with Regal Tube." It fur-
ther said that Copperweld intended to take "any and all steps
which are necessary to protect our rights under the terms of our
purchase agreement and to protect the know-how, trade secrets,
etc.," which Copperweld had purchased from Lear Siegler.
The tubing mill supplier received one of these letters two
days after entering the agreement with Independence and
promptly voided its acceptance of the deal. Independence tried to
re-establish the agreement but failed; by the time it finally secured
another contractor to construct a mill, operations had been set
back nine months.4
In 1976, Independence brought suit. Its complaint named
Copperweld Corporation, Phillip E. Smith (Copperweld's chief ex-
ecutive officer), Regal Corporation and the original mill supplier,
Yoder Corporation, as defendants. The complaint alleged that (1)
Copperweld, Regal, Smith and Yoder had conspired to restrain
trade in the structural steel tubing market in violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act, (2) Copperweld, Regal and Smith had at-
tempted to monopolize the market for steel tubing in violation of
section 2, (3) Yoder had breached its contract with Independence,
(4) Copperweld, Regal and Smith had interfered with Indepen-
dence's contractual relationship with Yoder and another corpora-
tion, and (5) Copperweld, Regal and Smith had slandered and li-
beled Independence.' 9
Before trial, Independence withdrew its monopolization claim
and dropped Smith as an individual defendant. The District
Court, by jury, found that Copperweld and Regal had conspired
to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, but that Yoder was not a
part of the conspiracy. The court also found that both Regal and
Copperweld had individually interfered with Independence's con-
tractual relations, that Regal had slandered Independence, and
that Yoder was liable for its breach. The jury awarded damages of
48. See id. at 2734-35.
49. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 314-15 (7th Cir.
1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
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$2,499,009 against Copperweld and Regal jointly and severally
for the antitrust violation and the claim that Copperweld induced
Yoder to breach its contract with Independence. This amount was
trebled to $7,497,027.50
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
lower court's decision, although it questioned the rationale behind
subjecting Copperweld and Regal to antitrust liability for a con-
spiracy in violation of section 1, especially where a corporation
and its unincorporated division would escape liability for the same
acts.
51
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to determine
whether a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are
legally capable of conspiring with each other under § 1 of the
Sherman Act."
'52
B. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Burger begins the Copperweld opinion by not-
ing that the Court had never considered the merits of the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine .5 He then states that "[a]lthough
the Court has expressed approval of the doctrine on a number of
occasions, a finding of intra-enterprise conspiracy was in all but
perhaps one instance unnecessary to the result. '5 4 This statement
is in direct reference to four prior Supreme Court cases that gave
rise to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
1. Examination of Precedents. In United States v. Yellow Cab
Co.,55 Morris Markin owned and controlled taxi cab companies
with substantial market shares in four large American cities.50
Markin was also the controlling shareholder in the Checker Cab
Manufacturing Corp. (CCM), which manufactured and distributed
taxi cabs. The government's complaint alleged that Markin, the
various cab companies, and CCM, had all conspired in violation of
50. Id. at 315.
51. Id. at 316-18.
52. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2734.
53. Id. at 2736.
54. Id.
55. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
56. The respective companies owned 100% of the available taxi cab licenses in Pitts-
burgh, 86% of the licenses in Chicago, 58% of the licenses in Minneapolis, and 15% of the
licenses in New York. Id. at 221.
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section 157 by means of an arrangement in which the operating
companies purchased cabs exclusively from CCM. In its opinion,
the Court noted that an unreasonable restraint "may result as
readily from a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or inte-
grated under common ownership as from a conspiracy among
those who are otherwise independent. . . . The corporate inter-
relationships of the conspirators . . . are not determinative of the
applicability of the Sherman Act." 8 Thus, the Court found that
an unreasonable restraint of trade existed, stating that "the com-
mon ownership and control of the various corporate appellees are
impotent to liberate the alleged combination and conspiracy from
the impact of the Act." 59 The Supreme Court went on to reverse
the lower court's dismissal of the complaint and hold that the de-
fendants had conspired in violation of section 1.
In Copperweld, however, the Court concluded that the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine was irrelevant to the decision in
Yellow Cab. It asserted that the original acquisitions of the taxi cab
companies by Markin were themselves illegal.6 0 (All the operating
companies had at some time been independent and had come
under Markin's control by acquisition or merger.) Chief Justice
Burger distinguished the Yellow Cab holding by claiming that the
"restraint of trade was 'the primary object of the [initial] combi-
nation [of the corporations],' which was created in a 'deliberate,
calculated' manner," and thus any findings later of a conspiracy
between the now affiliated corporations were irrelevant.61 While it
seems that perhaps in hindsight this was a plausible conclusion, it
is not at all clear that this was a finding or part of the rationale of
the Yellow Cab Court.
6 2
The next case to come before the Supreme Court involving
this issue was Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.63
The Court, in this case, held that two wholly owned subsidiaries
of a liquor distillery, who acted as the distillery's distributors, vio-
lated section 1 of the Sherman Act by jointly refusing to supply a
57. The complaint also alleged a conspiracy under § 2 but the Court did not reach
this claim. See id. at 233.
58. Id. at 227.
59. Id.
60. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2737.
61. Id. (footnote omitted).
62. Accord id. at 2746-47 (Stevens J., dissenting).
63. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
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wholesaler. The action was brought by the wholesaler who had
declined to abide by a resale price maintenance scheme which
fixed prices at an excessive level. The trial court found that the
subsidiaries had conspired to fix prices, but the court of appeals
reversed on the theory that such closely affiliated corporations
could not conspire under section 1 of the Act. Citing Yellow Cab,
but adding no further discussion, the Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals' ruling, noting that its decision "runs counter to
our past decisions that common ownership and control does not
liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws."
'64
Chief Justice Burger in Copperweld states that Kiefer-Stewart is
"the one case giving support to the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine," but then goes on to note that if decided today, the
same holding could arise through a finding of conspiracy between
the subsidiaries and other wholesalers who agreed to the
scheme. 5
The next decision discussed in Copperweld is Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States.6 This case involved restrictive hori-
zontal agreements between an American corporation and two for-
eign corporations operating in France and Great Britain. The
American corporation, however, owned only a 50% and a 30%
interest, respectively, in the foreign corporations. The Copperweld
Court dismissed the significance of the Timken analysis in light of
the fact that American Timken had less than a majority or con-
trolling interest in each of the foreign subsidiaries. The Court also
noted that, like the situation in Yellow Cab, there was evidence that
the original stock acquisitions themselves were violations of the
Act.6
7
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.68 is the last
case which the majority discusses in its assault on intra-enterprise
conspiracy precedent. This case involved a suit brought by
franchised dealers of the Midas muffler chain alleging a conspir-
64. Id. at 215.
65. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2738 n.9 (footnote omitted).
66. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
67. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2739. The obvious question that arises in light of the
Court's treatment of Timken, as well as its explicit limitation of the Copperweld holding to
parents and wholly owned subsidiaries, is what treatment will be afforded business enter-
prises charged with violations of section 1 where ownership between the corporations is less
than 100%. For a brief discussion of this issue, see infra note 73.
68. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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acy between a parent corporation and its three wholly owned sub-
sidiaries, in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The dealers
argued that agreements obligating them to sell at fixed retail
prices, to purchase only Midas mufflers and parts, to operate only
within fixed territories, etc., constituted undue restraints of
trade. 9 The Court stated that because the defendants "availed
themselves of the privilege of doing business through separate
corporations, the fact of common ownership could not save them
from any of the obligations that the law imposes on separate
entities.
'7 0
Although the Perma Life Mufflers opinion employs the lan-
guage of the doctrine, the Copperweld majority points out that
each plaintiff could have charged a conspiracy between the de-
fendants and itself or between the defendants and other
franchised dealers. 1 Thus, the Court concluded that a finding of
a violation of section 1 need not have rested upon application of
the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine to the affiliated
corporations.
2. Arguments for Exempting Unilateral Conduct. The Copperweld
majority basically advances two related arguments for exempting
conduct of affiliated corporations from section 1. First, they con-
tend that, like the situation where officers or employees of a single
corporation act on that corporation's behalf (i.e., intra-corporate
conspiracy), there are "not separate economic actors . . . previ-
ously pursuing divergent goals" suddenly being brought together
through agreement.7 2 There is no threat to competition between
affiliated corporations because there is no competition to begin
with-such affiliated entities always represent a "complete unity
of [economic] interest" and "purpose. '73 Second, the Court be-
69. The lower court dismissed the complaint, in pari delicto. The Supreme Court in
reversing and remanding for a trial on the merits stated that the common law doctrine has
no application to treble damage actions for antitrust violations. Id. at 137-38. "The plain-
tiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may be no less morally reprehensible than the
defendant, but the law encourages his suit to further the overriding public policy in favor
of competition." Id. at 139.
70. Id. at 141-42.
71. Id.
72. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2741.
73. Id. at 2742.
A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest.
Their objectives are common, not disparate; their general corporate actions are
guided or determined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but one.
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lieves there is only a minimal threat posed to competitive condi-
tions by the actions of a single enterprise. This threat is clearly
outweighed by the possibility that subjecting the activities of such
an organization to section 1 scrutiny would hamper its legitimate,
pro-competitive decisionmaking ability, and generally expose the
entity to unwarranted liability for otherwise lawful acts.
The Court attempts to bolster its first claim by exposing a
Congressional mandate said to exist within the Sherman Act
which distinguishes between "concerted" activity (covered by sec-
tion 1) and "unilateral" activity (covered by section 2). 4 "The
conduct of a single firm . . . is unlawful only when it threatens
actual monopolization. 7 5 The Court reasons that the Congress
enacting the Sherman Act recognized that "it is sometimes diffi-
cult to distinguish robust competition from conduct with long-run
anti-competitive effects," ' and thus incorporated this distinction.
However, such an interpretation of Congressional intent ap-
pears unsupported by the legislative history of the Sherman Act.
77
* . . With or without a formal "agreement," the subsidiary acts for the benefit
of the parent, its sole shareholder.
• . . They share a common purpose whether or not the parent keeps a tight
rein over the subsidiary; the parent may assert full control at any moment if the
subsidiary fails to act in the parent's best interests.
Id.
This line of reasoning adds insight to the question raised earlier as to what result would
ensue where the challenged activity is precipitated by an agreement between a parent and a
partially owned subsidiary. See supra note 67. Inherent in the Court's analysis is the notion
that the parent of a wholly owned subsidiary always has the power to control the course of
conduct followed by the subsidiary-the subsidiary acts at the will and for the benefit of its
majority shareholder. It would seem, therefore, that a court faced with a set of facts involv-
ing a partially owned subsidiary could apply Copperweld's rationale where the parent's hold-
ing in the subsidiary gave it power to exercise control over that subsidiary, i.e., where the
parent had a sufficient interest in the subsidiary by virtue of owning the amount of shares
necessary, given the current shareholder configuration, to exert managerial control over
the corporation. As one commentator noted before Copperweld, "[a]s long as the parent
holds more than 50%, control is being exercised through ownership rather than through
an agreement." McQuade, supra note 8, at 212. In fact, a recent New York district court
decision supports this proposition. See Magnum Force Distribs. v. Bon Bon Co. of Am.,
Inc., No. 84-2629 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (an order dismissing a section 1 claim where one corpo-
ration had a controlling 60% interest in the firm with which it was alleged to have
conspired).
74. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2740 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984)).
75. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2740.
76. Id.
77. See Comment, Has the Supreme Court Pulled the Plug, supra note 16, at 878-90. The
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Rather it reflects a choice of the majority to emphasize the evi-
dentiary problems associated with an action under section 1 at the
expense of promoting substantive antitrust objectives .7
The majority further claims that the reason Congress chose
this bifurcated analysis of anticompetitive conduct is readily
observable:
Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. It deprives
the marketplace of the independent centers of decisionmaking that competi-
tion assumes and demands. In any conspiracy, two or more entities that pre-
viously pursued their own interests separately are combining to act as one
for their common benefit.7
Clearly this is true where the agreement restrains trade or
competition between or among the conspirators. Where, on the
other hand, the restraint is aimed at outsiders to the conspiracy, the
Court's analysis simply does not apply. This latter type of restraint
is the one presented to the Court in Copperweld; it leads to the
deprivation of an independent center of decisionmaking in the
marketplace to the same degree as the former type of restraint.
Such deprivation, however, does not arise from a coming to-
gether, through agreement or otherwise, of multiple entities that
previously pursued their own courses of dealing. Rather, it results
from the exclusionary activities of one economic entity to the det-
riment of another. Thus, contrary to the majority's contention,
unilateral conduct may be just as fraught with anti-competitive
risk as is concerted action.
The majority also takes the position that by subjecting single
firm or entity conduct to section 1 scrutiny, an enterprise would
be exposed to antitrust liability for what are essentially internal
managerial decisions. In addition, by following such a course, the
''competitive zeal" desired of business firms would be destroyed.
two-party requirement inserted to amend the original draft of section 1 was included in
response to jurisdictional concerns rather than from a desire to insulate single-firm activity
from the proscriptions of section 1. See id. at 880.
Cf Barndt, supra note 8, at 175 n.90 (the statute does not mandate the corporation as
the unit of conspiracy); Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 920,
1003 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Conspiracy] ("[a]lthough the legislators
were immediately concerned with the activities of the classic trusts, there is nothing in the
legislative history to indicate that Congress intended the actions of a single corporation to
be exempt from conspiracy prosecution").
78. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2752 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2741.
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"Subjecting a single firm's every action to judicial scrutiny for rea-
sonableness would threaten to discourage the competitive enthusi-
asm that the antitrust laws seek to promote."' ' 0
Clearly, the result this "parade of horribles" rationale
portends would never likely be reached. The motivations of mod-
ern business enterprises are influenced by a host of diverse eco-
nomic and social factors. It would appear to be overreaching spec-
ulation to proclaim that a contrary interpretation of the antitrust
laws would have such a profound effect on business activity. Fur-
ther, not "every action" would be subject to liability-internal co-
ordination efforts of a firm would remain sufficiently insulated."1
As long as all such situations are at least given a cursory examina-
tion on their merits, 2 and a significant body of case law develops,
business entities can plausibly guide their operations without sub-
stantial antitrust insecurity, and the ultimate aims and objectives
of the Act would be better preserved.
3. Repudiation of the Doctrine. In specifically addressing the in-
tra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, the majority notes that a major
criticism of the doctrine is that it emphasizes form over sub-
stance. 3 It is said to give undue significance to the form of a cor-
porate enterprise by distinguishing the acts of a corporation and
its unincorporated divisions (which had always been exempt) and
the acts of a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary
(which had been subject to scrutiny)."
Advocates of this position have noted that "there is nothing
inherently anticompetitive about the use of corporate subsidiar-
ies;"'8 5 separately incorporated subdivisions are normally formed
in response to totally unrelated considerations (e.g., achieving eco-
nomic efficiencies or other production advantages).8 8 Hence,
under the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, application of sec-
tion 1 is said to hinge upon the nature of the enterprise's struc-
ture, thereby creating a distinction that does not foster any sub-
stantive antitrust goals.8 7
80. Id. at 2744.
81. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 167-71.
83. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2740.
84. See generally supra note 8.
85. Handler & Smart, supra note 8, at 62. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2743 & n.19.
86. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2743.
87. See id. at 2743; Areeda, supra note 8, at 452.
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These arguments and observations are undoubtedly correct.
In the antitrust context, any distinction between an unincorpo-
rated division and a wholly owned subsidiary is artificial and does
not promote any substantive policies-allowing diverse treatment
in such a situation is simply not justified. It will be argued below,
however, that the proper course requires including the intra-cor-
porate situation in actions under section 1, instead of excluding in-
tra-enterprise arrangements.
The majority, in its analysis, also acknowledges the existence
of the "gap" in Sherman Act coverage resulting from its defini-
tions of "unilateral" and "concerted" activities."8 It recognizes
that "[a]n unreasonable restraint of trade may be effected not
only by two independent firms acting in concert; a single firm may
restrain trade to precisely the same extent if it alone possesses the
combined market power of those same two firms."89 Nonetheless,
the majority concludes that because section 1 does not prohibit all
unreasonable restraints, but only those implemented by contract,
combination or conspiracy,90 the anticompetitive conduct of a sin-
gle firm or entity is thus excluded from the realm of section 1.91
Finally, the Court characterizes its role as one of determining
whether the logic underlying the Congressional intent (as the
Court has interpreted it) to exclude "unilateral" activity from sec-
tion 1 is applicable to the activity of a parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary. Having decided earlier that the behavior in question
did not meet the requirement of concerted conduct between two
or more independent economic entities, the majority "can only
conclude" that it should not be included within the class of con-
duct which is prohibited by section 1.92
The obvious problem with the Court's analysis and ultimate
88. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2744.
89. Id.
90. Id. A major rhetorical roadblock to a finding of section 1 violations by single eco-
nomic entities goes as follows: under the Sherman Act, restraining trade is not in itself
illegal-it is only illegal to contract, combine or conspire to restrain trade. See ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 38, at 30-31. As will be discussed in Part III, however, an
agreement is not characterized as a "conspiracy" under section 1 unless it is determined to
have resulted in an unreasonable restraint of trade. See infra notes 114-16 and accompany-
ing text. The proposition forwarded above then "assumes the thing to be proved and rea-
sons in a circle; viz., there is no unlawful restraint unless there is a conspiracy, and there
can be no conspiracy unless there is an unlawful restraint." Kramer, supra note 19, at 134.
91. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2744.
92. Id. at 2745.
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conclusion is that it fails to deal adequately with the facts
presented in the Copperweld case. It does not distinguish between
situations where two otherwise rival firms join forces to limit com-
petition between them, and those cases in which a business entity,
through some form of economic coercion, inhibits the ability of a
competitor to operate within a given market. The dissent, on the
other hand, does make this distinction.
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens' dissent first questions the need for a new per
se rule or redefinition of the word "conspiracy" based upon the
facts presented in the Copperweld case:
Precisely because they do not eliminate competition that would other-
wise exist but rather enhance the ability to compete, restraints which enable
effective integration between a corporate parent and its subsidiary . . . are
not prohibited by § 1 ....
In contrast, the case before us today presents the type of restraint that
has precious little to do with effective integration between parent and sub-
sidiary corporations. Rather, the purpose of the challenged conduct was to
exclude a potential competitor of the subsidiary from the market.9 3
Justice Stevens notes that the existing rule of reason analysis
provides the courts with an adequate means of identifying and dis-
tinguishing between procompetitive internal decisionmaking and
conduct which works an unreasonable restraint on marketwide
competition; thus, he feels that the formulation of a new rule is
not necessary to protect internal integration efforts. 4
The dissent also is at odds with the majority's repudiation of
prior case law. It notes that, regardless of the majority's attempts
to distinguish prior decisions based upon possible alternative hold-
ings, each case does in fact rest on a section 1 conspiracy theory
among related parties.
95
Turning to the adoption of the Sherman Act, the dissent calls
attention to the intentionally broad, all-encompassing nature of
the statute. Early judicial interpretation placed emphasis on the
substance of the alleged violation, rather than the form through
which it was effectuated.9 6 Justice Stevens also notes that the stat-
93. Id. at 2746 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. See id. at 2746-49.
96. See id. at 2749 (passage citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60
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ute was written against the background of the common law, which
recognized conspiracies among affiliated corporations as well as
among the officers or employees of a single corporation. 97 Ironi-
cally, he concludes, the majority's holding now frees from section
1 those corporate structures most similar to the original trusts
which spurred adoption of the Act in the first place.98
The dissent also questions the majority's economic interpreta-
tion of the plurality of actors requirement embodied in the terms
"contract, combination or conspiracy." The majority's require-
ment of two independent entities is not the result of "any eco-
nomic principle." 99 If Congress had been guided by economic the-
ory in formulating section 1, it would have focused on the
existence of market power, rather than upon a plurality of ac-
tors.100 It can thus be seen that the majority's emphasis on inde-
pendent economic entities has little true economic significance.101
Insightfully, the dissent suggests that the intra-enterprise conspir-
acy doctrine was adopted to address the statute's failure to con-
sider the effect of unilateral market power generated by closely
affiliated firms.1 2
Finally, the dissent recognizes the distinction that the major-
ity failed to acknowledge between internal and external restraints:
"When conduct restrains trade not merely by integrating affiliated
corporations but rather by restraining the ability of others to com-
pete, that conduct has competitive significance drastically different
from procompetitive integration."10 3 Where the conduct of the al-
leged conspirators "raised barriers to entry and imposed an appre-
ciable marketwide restraint," the form or relationship among the
organizational actors should not control the application of section
1: "If, as seems to be the case, the challenged conduct was mani-
festly anticompetitive, it should not be immunized from scrutiny
under § 1 of the Sherman Act." 104
(1911)).
97. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2750 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 2750-51.
99. Id. at 2752.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2752 n.20.
102. See id. at 2752.
103. Id. at 2754.
104. Id. at 2746.
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III. INTRA-CORPORATE CONSPIRACIES
The majority opinion in Copperweld bases, to a large extent,
its analysis of intra-enterprise conspiracy on the existing law of in-
tra-corporate conspiracy. Previously, many of the lower courts
had held that the plurality of actors requirement of section I was
not satisfied by the conduct of the personnel of a single firm or
corporation.10 5 The rule had thus been established that a single
corporation was incapable of conspiring in violation of section
1.10 The Copperweld Court equates intra-enterprise and intra-cor-
porate conspiracy because both involve closely related actors
working for the benefit of the same economic entity.
107
A. Origin of the Rule
The notion that the personnel of a single firm are incapable
of conspiring in violation of section 1 appears to have its origins in
the 1952 court of appeals decision of Nelson Radio and Supply Co.
v. Motorola, Inc.108 In this case, the plaintiff was a wholesaler and
distributor of the defendant's products in certain counties of Ala-
bama and Florida. The parties operated under a distributors'
agreement renewable each year. For the year 1948, Motorola
modified the agreement so as to prohibit the plaintiff from selling
Motorola communication equipment or any communication
equipment manufactured by Motorola's competitors. Motorola,
105. See supra note 3. Note that Copperweld represents the first time that the Supreme
Court has given approval to the intra-corporate exemption. See Note, Conspiring Entities,
supra note 8, at 662-63.
106. See, e.g., supra note 3. For a list of additional examples, see Note, Conspiring Enti-
ties, supra note 8, at 661 n.2.
The rule that officers or agents of a single corporate entity cannot conspire in violation
of section 1 is not absolute, however. For instance, at least one case has held that where
corporate insiders have an "independent personal stake" in the outcome of the alleged
conspiracy, the court can find the requisite plurality of actors, notwithstanding that all are
members of the same business entity. Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc.,
496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974).
In addition, some cases apply different treatment where an "outside" corporate agent is
involved. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668
F.2d 1014, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); International Travel
Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255, 1257-58, 1266 (8th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980) (conspiracy between corporation and its advertising
agency).
107. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2741-42.
108. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). But see Arthur v.
Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1937).
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however, could distribute such equipment itself or enlist another
to do the same within plaintiff's assigned territory. In negotiation
of an agreement for the next year, plaintiff sought to have these
restrictions removed, since communications equipment had be-
come a very lucrative and growing category of sales. The defend-
ant refused to yield, and on February 10, 1949, terminated its
contract and business relations with the plaintiff.
In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that "[s]ince November,
1947, said defendant [Motorola], and Paul V. Calvin, the presi-
dent and a director of defendant's corporation, and William H.
Kelly, its sales manager, and its officers, employees, representa-
tives and agents. . . unlawfully have engaged. . . in a conspiracy
in restraint of the . . . trade and commerce among the several
states in Motorola and said communication equipment .... ",,01
The complaint then went on to allege, specifically, the acts and
means by which the conspiracy was carried out. In upholding the
lower court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a
claim, the court of appeals indicated that the complaint was defi-
cient because it contained merely the general allegation of con-
spiracy which is but "the allegation of a legal conclusion."110 The
opinion, however, went on to state that
apart from this infirmity we think that the allegation claiming the existence
of a conspiracy under Section 1 contains a more fundamental defect. It is
basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or entities to
have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with itself any more than a
private individual can, and it is the general rule that the acts of the agent are
the acts of the corporation. Here it is alleged that the conspiracy existed
between the defendant corporation, its president,. . . its sales manager, ...
and its officers, employees, representatives and agents who have been ac-
tively engaged in the management, direction and control of the affairs and
business of defendant. This is certainly a unique group of conspirators.""
While at first the court's logic seems appealing, the analysis is
not entirely correct. The inquiry should not be whether a corpo-
ration can conspire "with" itself or an employee. Rather, the rele-
vent question is whether the firm can be held liable for a conspir-
acy "among" the members of the intra-corporate family. For
instance, if two corporate officers have implemented a plan to
109. Nelson Radio, 200 F.2d at 913.




foreclose a potential competitor from participation in the market,
then although the corporation must necessarily act through its
agents, it has not conspired "with itself.1 11 2 One may alternatively
claim that the officers have conspired with "each other," and for
the sake of furthering important antitrust policy, impute liability
for the acts of the agents to the corporation vicariously. Thus, the
discussion of this issue in Nelson Radio should have centered on
"whether a conspiracy can exist between the officers of a corpora-
tion acting among themselves in its behalf; and if so, whether the
corporation can be held liable."11 3 Any analysis or reasoning
based on the corporation's inability to conspire "with itself" is
completely misguided.
Further, it is clear that the majority opinion in Nelson Radio
fails to recognize the relationship between "conspiracies" and "re-
straints of trade" under section 1. Practically speaking, the ques-
tion of whether a "conspiracy" exists for the purposes of section 1
is inextricably linked to the issue of whether the conduct com-
plained of results in an unreasonable restraint of trade. The par-
ties to a valid, otherwise lawful agreement, for instance, are not
classified as "conspirators" even though they have agreed to fol-
low some concerted course of action;114 only when the agreement
is perceived as imposing an undue burden on trade or competition
in contravention of the Act does the question of conspiracy
arise. 5 As one commentator has duly noted, "the purpose of
112. Compare Professor Barndt's discussion:
[lit appears to me that where. . . the cases speak of a "conspiracy solely between
a corporation and its officers. . ." [they are] failing to analyze the problem care-
fully . . . . The corporation through its officers may conspire with other parties
, * .and the officers of a corporation may conspire among themselves on behalf
of their corporation, but it is logically impossible for them to conspire with their
own corporation.
Barndt, supra note 8, at 180.
113. Id. at 184.
114. It has been noted that the terms of the statute-"contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy"-represent what is in reality a single concept embracing the notion of "con-
certed action." See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 445-46 (3d Cir. 1977) (quot-
ing L. SuLLivAN, LAW OF ANTmusT 312 (1977)). The term "conspirators" in the text is not
used in this light. Rather, it is used in the classic sense to illustrate actors gathering and
agreeing to follow an unlawful course of conduct.
115. Accord Barndt, supra note 8, at 182. ("It is . . .essential that the nature of the
conduct be evaluated, since only if the conduct is such a$ to impose an unreasonable re-
straint on trade is it necessary to determine whether the means of imposing that restraint
was by contract, combination, or conspiracy.").
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characterizing a relationship as a conspiracy is to control or forbid
it."11 That the Nelson Radio Court fails to make this distinction is
evidenced by the following passage:
Surely discussions among those engaged in the management, direction and
control of a corporation concerning the price at which the corporation will
sell its goods, the quantity it will produce, the type of customers or market
to be served, or the quality of goods to be produced do not result in the
corporation being engaged in a conspiracy in unlawful restraint of trade
under the Sherman Act.
117
By characterizing the activities of the defendant and its employees
as such, it dismisses the possibility of any conspiracy by first dis-
missing the possibility of any unreasonable restraint of trade. The ma-
jority viewed the officers' conduct as nothing more than "their
day to day jobs in formulating and carrying out its [Motorola's]
managerial policy," and eventually found that the defendant's
conduct amounted to no more than a "mere refusal to deal fur-
ther with the plaintiff." ' In contrast, Judge Rives in his dissent
appeared convinced that the acts of the defendant's officers and
agents were in contravention of the antitrust laws.119 Note that in
the vast majority of cases following Nelson Radio the courts failed
to give any indication that the conduct complained of was in any
way unreasonable or in contravention of the Act.120
Arguably, then, the Court's decision in Nelson Radio need not,
and indeed should not, have considered the issue of conspiratorial
capacity. Rather, the claim should have been analyzed by the ma-
jority on the basis of its sufficiency in alleging facts evincing an
unreasonable restraint of trade.
The majority's position in Nelson Radio is an excellent exam-
ple of the failure of the relevant judicial decisions to properly ad-
116. Areeda, supra note 8, at 454.
117. Nelson Radio, 200 F.2d at 914.
118. Id. at 914-15. It is also posssible that at least initially the court may have felt
constrained to find a conspiracy "among" only one named defendant. See id.
119. See id. at 916 (Rives, J, dissenting).
120. See, e.g., Morton Bldgs. of Nebraska v. Morton Bldgs. Inc., 531 F.2d 910 (8th Cir.
1976); Chapman v. Rudd Paint Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969); Brehm v. Gobel Brew-
ing Co., 1952-1953 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,431 (W.D. Mich. 1953); Marion County Coop.
Ass'n v. Carnation Co., 114 F. Supp. 58 (W.D. Ark. 1953). See also Barndt, supra note 8, at
182 n.152 ("note [none] of the cases which issued the blanket statement that an intra-
corporate conspiracy is an impossibility have involved fact situations which have put the
question to the test. In all, the court has been dealing with a situation in which the conduct
was not considered detrimental to the public interest").
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dress the difference between the economic requirements of a "re-
straint of trade" and the legal requirements of a "conspiracy." A
single firm or corporation cannot restrain trade "with it-
self"-two or more distinct economic units are needed for there
to be competition, and thus for there to be any restraint
thereof.121 However, two independent economic entities are not
necessary for a finding of an ordinary conspiracy; any two legal
persons can .conspire.22 In other contexts, the courts regularly
121. Consider Professor Sullivan's analysis:
Picture. . . a family business which operates one retail store in each of three or
four adjacent communities. All of the stores are managed as a unit by one indi-
vidual, the founder of the business who sets policy, does all the buying, decides
on all the advertising, sets prices, and hires and fires all employees other than
family members. . . . If there is, as a practical matter, an integrated ownership
and management, this small business is a single firm. And a single firm cannot
compete with itself. Hence it cannot restrain price competition with itself, or
divide markets with itself, . . . or otherwise restrain competition with itself, re-
gardless of how many separate corporations the single firm [enterprise] may
* . . be divided into.
L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 326-27 (1977).
122. Generally, in the law of conspiracy no special requirements as to the nature of
the conspirators themselves are necessary for a conspiracy to exist. Rather any limitations
focus on the act of conspiring itself. See, e.g., Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco,
Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981) (conspiracy re-
quires "conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful ob-
jective") (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court stated the classic definition of conspiracy in American Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946) as "a unity of purpose or a common design and
understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement. ... Note that even
in this quintessential antitrust case no overt qualifications as to the nature of the conspira-
tors were included. See id. See also Welling, Intracorporate Plurality in Criminal Conspiracy
Law, 33 HASTNGS L.J. 1155, 1166-67 (1982). Professor Sullivan provides some insight as to
how the current confusion over the term "conspiracy" could have been avoided and how a
court should proceed when faced with the intra-entity situation:
We have in [alleged intra-entity conspiracy cases] two related questions. Is there
a conspiracy? Is trade unreasonably restrained? We need at least two legal per-
sons for a conspiracy and they may be related units. Also, we need at least two
firms for trade to be restrained. They may be competitors acting together, or
one may be the victim of exclusionary conduct of the other; . . . . Courts need
not take the same test of plurality for both aspects of the problem.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 121, at 327 (emphasis added); see also supra note 121. However,
this is exactly what the courts have done. They have formulated a definition of "conspir-
acy" in the context of section 1 which can only be satisfied when conspirators are also the
competitors affected by the restraint of trade. In other words, section 1 is only satisfied in
the situation where two or more otherwise rival firms operating in the same relevant mar-
ket get together and agree on some course of action to limit competition between them.
However, "[s]ection I prohibits two types of restraint of trade: the unreasonable impair-
ment of competition among the parties to an agreement, and the adverse effect on the
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find that the officers or employees of a single corporation are ca-
rights of third parties resulting from joint action." Developments-Conspiracy, supra note 77,
at 1004 (emphasis added) (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 211 U.S. 1, 59 (1911)).
In the latter situation the conspirators are not necessarily the same as the competitors affected
by the restraint of trade.
The current definition of "conspiracy" followed by the courts, then, as espoused in the
Copperweld case (i.e., that only separate economic entities can satisfy the plurality of actors
necessary for a section 1 conspiracy) obliterates this distinction.
The majority in Copperweld was concerned with insulating internal decisionmaking of
the firm, and guarding against unlimited liability for such decisions. The proper focus,
however, should have been on whether a restraint of trade exists rather than the presence
of a "conspiracy." See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 121, at 328 ("[c]oncerted action" by two
"legal persons" which is limited solely to the internal management of a single firm does not
restrain competition; but "concerted action" by two "legal persons" which erects barriers
to entry by another separate firm, a competitor or potential competitor, can be a restraint
of trade).
The following examples serve to illustrate the distinction between the plurality required
for a restraint of trade and for a conspiracy. (Assume A, B, and C are distinct economic and
legal entities and all are operating or seeking to operate in the same relevant market).
1) A and B enter an arrangement whereby they agree to sell their otherwise
competing goods for a set price.
This agreement represents a classic case of price fixing. It eliminates price competition as
between A and B-they are no longer free to charge whatever price the market will allow
for their commodities-while it burdens trade in general by artificially setting a price for
the offered goods.
Because A and B would otherwise be competitors in the same market and are indepen-
dent entities, they provide the plurality required to find that a restraint of trade exists.
Further because A and B represent separate legal entities they too satisfy the plurality for a
finding of conspiracy.
2) A and B enter an arrangement whereby A agrees to buy from B and B agrees
to sell to A, widgets for one year.
This arrangement too represents a restraint of trade. A is prohibited from transacting with
other widget sellers, while B is prohibited from transacting with other widget buyers. The
ability of both parties to trade with those outside the contract is thereby restrained. Analy-
sis of the pluralities here is reserved for the moment.
3) A and B enter an arrangement whereby they agree to erect barriers to C's
entrance into their market.
Here again there is an obvious restraint of trade and competition. If A and B's efforts are
successful, C is precluded from competing in this market, at least temporarily. Thus, the
acts of A and B have restrained marketwide competition by eliminating a potential competi-
tor, and restricted possible trade with C by others within the market. But note that, unlike
example (1), the same entities do not satisfy the plurality requirements of conspiracy and
restraint of trade. In example (3), while A and B supply the conspiracy plurality, A, B and C;
A and C; or B and C, all supply the plurality necessary for "restraint of trade."
4) A acting alone, through two of its unincorporated divisions, erects barriers to
C's entrance to its market.
Once again, there is a restraint. It is identical to that in example (3), although it's initiated
by different actors. C is precluded from competing in the market, inhibiting marketwide
trade and competition. Here, however, the officers or agents of A satisfy the conspiracy plural-
ity, while A and C provide the restraint of trade plurality.
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pable of conspiring with each other or with the corporation. 2
The Copperweld Court itself recognized that "[n]othing in the lit-
eral meaning of [conspiracy] excludes coordinated conduct among
officers or employees of the same company. 12 4 It does not seem,
Recall example (2) above. In the scenario presented, A and B make up the independent
entities necessary for a "restraint of trade." But is there a conspiracy? If it is an otherwise
lawful agreement between the parties, then the restraint appears "reasonable." Do we
characterize the parties to a valid contract as "conspirators?" Obviously not. But herein lies
the point: whether or not a court is willing to find that a conspiracy exists is inextricably
entwined with, and must necessarily be preceded by, a determination of whether or not the
restraint is "unreasonable." See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
Cf. Welling,osupra, at 1166-67 ("[w]hile the rule [exemption of intra-corporate conspir-
acy] has been endorsed because an alternative may lead to unlimited liability, it has been
suggested that the potential of limitless liability could be avoided with more direct ap-
proaches based on the substantive antitrust law rather than on the definition of plurality")
(citations omitted).
123. See United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962); Lott v. United States, 367 U.S.
421 (1961); Nye & Nissen Corp. v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949); Hyde v. United
States, 225 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1911); United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 971-72 (11 th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943); Mininsohn v. United States, 101 F.2d 477 (3d
Cir. 1939); Barron v. United States, 5 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1925). See also ATrORNEY GEr-
ERAL'S REPORT, supra note 38, at 30-31; L. SULLVAN, supra note 121, at 324; Welling,
supra note 122, at 1191-99.
124. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2741. Cf Developments-Conspiracy, supra'note 77, at
1002-03 (citation omitted):
[Ilt does not appear unreasonable to suggest that a finding of Sherman Act
conspiracy within a single corporation may in some instances be warranted. It
seems that the legislature, having employed a word that has a common-law
meaning, should be presumed to have intended its common-law meaning unless
it appears that such a construction is not in accord with the purposes of the
statute.
There is an alternative argument supporting the notion that Congress intended to in-
clude intra-corporate conspiracies in section 1. Consider the use of the word "conspire" in
section 2. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Can the officers or agents of a single entity "conspire"
under section 2? The Attorney General's Report seems to take the position they can. See
ATrORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 38, at 30-31. But it is unlikely that Congress
would adopt such disparate meanings between the words "conspiracy" in section I and
"conspire" in section 2-i.e., recognize intra-corporate conspiracies in the latter but not in
the former. Further if the actors within a single entity could not conspire in violation of
section 2, the inclusion of the word "conspire" in section 2 would be entirely superfluous.
Concerted conduct by unrelated entities is covered by section 1. See Develop-
ments-Conspiray, supra note 77, at 1003.
Perhaps the best rationale for including intra-corporate conspiracies in section 1 is sim-
ply as follows:
The purpose of the statute was to foster a sound competitive economy, and it
seems that the act should be construed to prohibit not only those combinations
which at the time of its passage posed the greatest threat to competition, but
also any other means producing the undesirable market conditions which Con-
1985] INTRA-ENTITY CONSPIRACIES 579
however, that this failure to perceive the differences in the legal
and economic requirements of "conspiracy" and "restraint of
trade" is necessarily the result of judicial ineptness;' it is more
likely the result of a confused attempt at implementation of judi-
cial policy. As one commentator noted while discussing Nelson
Radio,
[t]he court's analysis ... is confusing. First, although it may be character-
ized as "basic" that conspiracy requires two persons in the sense of two
minds, it is not basic to all forms of conspiracy that two entities or two per-
sons, in the sense of two business associations, be involved. If the court
meant that two [economic] entities are basic to conspiracy under the antitrust
laws, to avoid confusion it should have stated this explicitly. 125
In fact it seems that this is the case: the current definition of
the term "conspiracy" in section 1, as embraced by the Court in
Copperweld, is really based upon considerations of economic policy
which the Court felt were necessary for the equitable and efficient
application of the antitrust laws.
B. Policy Considerations
As noted in the above analysis of Copperweld, one of the ma-
jor contentions against a finding of both intra-corporate and intra-
enterprise conspiracy rests upon the concern that by allowing such
a determination, neither a single corporation nor affiliated corpo-
rations could function as integrated business units.12 6
gress attempted to prevent, if the words of the statute will linguistically bear
such an interpretation.
Id.
125. Welling, supra note 122, at 1162-63 (emphasis original).
126. See McQuade, supra note 8, at 186-87; Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-trust Laws, 44
ILL L. REV. 743, 765-66 (1950); Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 26.
There is also the closely related concern that allowing recognition of intra-entity con-
spiracy would effectively subject business entities to unlimited liability under section 1. "If
a finding of section 1 conspiracy could be based on intracorporate agreements, practically
any unilateral firm action would be open to attack." Note, Conspiring Entities, supra note 8,
at 664. See Stengel, supra note 8, at 8. See also Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke
& Liquors Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 84 (9th Cir. 1969) (there is no "logical or practical way to
avoid holding that all intra-corporate agreements are or may be found to be conspiracies in
restraint of trade").
This line of reasoning, however, completely ignores the fact that section 1 only penal-
izes "unreasonable" restraints of trade. See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
Thus only those agreements worthy of antitrust scrutiny after a rule-of-reason analysis
would be subject to liability; procompetitive activities would be insulated. See infra note 134
and accompanying text.
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Many essential business procedures would, supposedly, be prohibited as per
se violations of the Sherman Act. These per se violations include agreements
to fix prices, control production, divide markets, and initiate boycotts. Once
such agreements are proven, a presumption arises that they unreasonably
restrain trade and are illegal. A recognition of intra-corporate or intra-en-
terprise conspiracy . . . would effectively preclude the necessary consulta-
tion among corporate officers regarding prices, markets, production, and the
like. 127
However, the slightest exercise of judicial "common sense"
and discretion could obviate these concerns entirely. In the intra-
entity context, blanket application of a per se rule should be pre-
cluded: "[c]orporate officers must coordinate the activities of divi-
sions and subsidiaries; discussions and decisions on prices, produc-
tion, and markets are essential to the business enterprise. ' 1 28
Courts, for precisely this reason, should not allow scrutiny of such
activity under a per se rule; the existing class of per se violations all
arose in the context of competing economic entities agreeing
among themselves to limit competition. Because this is not the
case in factual settings such as the one presented in Copperweld, a
per se rule simply should not be applied.129
Another somewhat related concern behind the current rule
arises from a fear of misidentifying the effect of certain courses of
action where only one firm is involved. Two independent firms
acting in concert in accordance with an agreement between them
will always evidence a restraint of trade; the inquiry then becomes
whether or not it is unreasonable.130 The nature of single firm
conduct, however, short of attempts to monopolize, is said to be
more difficult to define. For instance, the internal decisionmaking
of the leading firm in a market may have external effects on its
competitors."' In this sense, it is "difficult to distinguish robust
competition from conduct with long-run anti-competitive effects
.~ "I" Thus, excluding single firm or enterprise conduct from
127. Comment, Corporate Liability, supra note 8, at 249 (citing Stengel, supra note 8,
at 23).
128. Comment, Corporate Liability, supra note 8, at 252 (emphasis added).
129. Cf Developments-Conspiracy, supra note 77, at 1004. "The fact that certain activ-
ities may be per se unreasonable when done by competitors should not preclude the courts
from a more detailed examination in the case of a single enterprise in order to determine
whether the activities in question are in fact unreasonable." Id. (emphasis added).
130. See infra notes 172-76.
131. See Note, Has the Supreme Court Pulled the Plug, supra note 16, at 886.
132. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2740.
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section 1 "reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will dampen the
competitive zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur. "133
As was noted earlier, however, difficulty in identifying an-
ticompetitive conduct or fear of thwarting "competitive zeal"
does not seem adequate justification for restructuring the scope of
the term "conspiracy." In the antitrust context, the rule-of-reason
analysis would adequately identify anticompetitive conduct, and
safeguard against any unjustified prosecution under the Act.'
Only those restraints manifestly anti-competitive would be
punished.
C. Economic Considerations
The majority in Copperweld seems to imply that its current in-
terpretation of section 1 requiring concerted action by distinct ec-
onomic units has economic justification. However, as the dissent
points out, this is simply not the case. 13 5 Rather, from an eco-
nomic standpoint, the presence of market power should be the
overriding factor. 13 6 "Unilateral conduct by a firm with market
power has no less anticompetitive potential then conduct by a plu-
rality of actors which generates or exploits the same power, and
probably more, since the unilateral actor avoids the policing
problems faced by cartels.1
13 7
The following example helps illustrate this position: A parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary operate, respectively,
a newspaper and a radio station in the same city. Assume that the
radio station, which has no local competitors, were to deny adver-
tising to a local business because the latter advertised in a rival
newspaper.13 8 Such practices by the parent/subsidiary entity
clearly restrain free trade and competition in the newspaper mar-
133. Id.
134. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2745 (justice Stevens' discussion of the "Court's
New Rule"). See also Nelson Radio, 200 F.2d at 918 (Rives, J., dissenting). But see Note, Has
the Supreme Court Pulled the Plug, supra note 16, at 884.
135. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2752 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id. The determination of relative "market power" and its sources is of primary
concern in an action brought under § 2. For a brief overview of the economic considera-
tions involved, see Johnson & Ferrill, supra note 22, at 612 n.96. "Market power" is also
considered in assessing the competitive impact of vertical nonprice restraints. See ABA,
supra note 7, at 19-20.
137. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2752 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 121, at 327.
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ket. As the illustration points out, however, it is not the concerted
action here involved which necessarily gives rise to the restraint of
trade; it is rather action "utilizing such market power as is possessed
by the firm . . . in order to erect a competitive barrier in front of
a competitor"1 9 that creates the restraint on competition.
D. Alternative Means of Policing Unilateral Activity
The final argument against section 1 findings of intra-entity
conspiracies concerns the necessity of such a theory in current an-
titrust enforcement. Single firm conduct, it is argued, is ade-
quately policed by other sections of the law.14 0 For instance sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act empowers the
Commission to forbid "unfair methods of competition. 1 4 2 Sup-
posedly, this provision enables the FTC to prohibit single entity
conduct which is harmful or potentially harmful to business com-
petition whether or not otherwise culpable under the antitrust
laws. 42 Unlike the Sherman Act, however, the Federal Trade
Commission Act does not provide criminal penalties for violations,
nor does it establish a private right of action.143 Further, the FTC
as a matter of policy, only pursues those cases affected with a sig-
nificant "public interest." Hence, the overall deterrent effect of
FTC action in the context of the present discussion is open to
question. There is also evidence that, in general, government en-
forcement of the antitrust laws, be it action by the FTC or Justice
Department, is necessarily limited in both span of coverage and
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2745; Areeda, supra note 8, at 456; Handler &
Smart, supra note 8, at 70-71.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982).
142. For example, in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972), the
Supreme Court decided that under § 5, the FTC had the power "to define and proscribe
an unfair competitive practice, even though the practice does not infringe either the letter
or the spirit of the antitrust laws .... "
143. See P. AREEDA, ANTrrRusT ANALYSIS 69 (3rd ed. 1981). The primary means
through which agency action is accomplished is through "cease and desist" administrative
orders. See id. In addition, an FTC action must involve the "public interest," not merely a
private dispute between competitors. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 21 (1929).
Other provisions of the law are also pointed up by critics as deterring single-entity activ-
ity. See Note, The Long Awaited Death Knell of the Intra-Enterprise Doctrine, 30 VILL L. REV.
521, 562 n.162 (1985). Close examination, however, reveals these sections are really of de
minimis effect upon single entity activity after initial combinations and short of attempts to
monopolize. See id.
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overall effect."" This has sparked one commentator to note:
"The limited time and resources of the government reduce the
effectiveness of the Federal Trade Commission Act and point up
the desirability of permitting private litigants to attack anticompe-
titive schemes through the doctrine of intra-corporate
conspiracy.' '145
Similarly, critics point to the existence of state common law
actions for unfair competition or interference with contract as
means of keeping the anticompetitive activity of unilateral actors
in check. 146 State actions, however, typically impose a much
greater evidentiary burden upon private plaintiffs than do pro-
ceedings under the federal antitrust laws. 147 In addition, the po-
tential for recovery under the two types of actions is greatly dispa-
rate. A successful plaintiff under section 1 is entitled to recover
treble damages for his injuries, whereas the state law plaintiff has
no such right.148 Irrespective of the specifics of state law remedies
differentiating recovery between two plaintiffs solely on the basis
of whether related or unrelated entities have acted seems com-
pletely unjustified. Where the substantive acts are the same, recov-
eries too should be identical.
Moreover, private antitrust suits, and the accompanying
threat of treble damage recovery, have long been recognized for
144. See P. AREEDA, supra note 143, at 54-55, 70-72; Handler & Stever, Attempts to
Monopolize & No Fault Monopolization, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 178 (1980).
145. Comment, Corporate Liability, supra note 8, at 254.
146. See Handler & Smart, supra note 8, at 71; Note, Has the Supreme Court Pulled the
Plug, supra note 16, at 879-81.
Most states also have constitutional or other statutory antitrust provisions. However,
because of their similar construction to the Sherman Act, intrastate conspiracies follow the
same general rules as interstate violations. See 54 Am. JuR. 2D Monopolies §§ 458, 623.
147. For instance, in most state common law actions for interference with contract,
plaintiffs must show that the defendant acted knowingly and intentionally to disrupt its
contractual relationships. See Note, Antitrust Treatment of Competitive Torts: An Argument for
a Role of Per Se Legality Under the Sherman Act, 58 TEx. L. Rav. 415, 419 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Antitrust Treatment of Competitive Torts]. Many state actions, in addition, still
require that the causal connection between the acts complained of and the injuries alleged
be clearly shown. The federal antitrust laws on the other hand often allow a jury to infer
that injury suffered by the plaintiff was caused by the Defendant's acts. See Note, The Pick-
Barth Doctrine: Should Unfair Competition Belong Under the Sherman Act?, 31 BAYLOR L. Rv.
253, 261 (1979).
148. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any private person "injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall re-
cover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
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the important role they play in overall antitrust enforcement:
"[T]he purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring
that the private action will be an ever present threat to deter any-
one contemplating business behavior in violation of the anti-trust
laws."
149
It can also be argued that, at least in certain instances, the
substantive acts of restraint of trade and unfair competition are
really not that different. For instance, in many cases involving sec-
tion 1, the specific practices in question bear a remarkable resem-
blance to those activities culpable under the common law of unfair
competition. 150 The key distinction would seem to lie in the end
result: acts having a "substantially adverse" effect on competition
within the relevant market 51 would qualify as unreasonable re-
149. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
150. In the landmark antitrust case of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911), the Justice Department successfully engaged the Sherman Act to combat such activ-
ities as local price cutting, establishment of bogus independents, preferred customer re-
bates, and espionage. In Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 238
U.S. 635 (1915), the Sherman Act was used to punish acts such as espionage, enticement of
competitor's employees, the manufacture of inferior imitations of competitors' products,
threatening infringement suits in bad faith, maintaining bogus independents, inducing
breach of contract, circulating false reports of competitor's financial standing and commer-
cial disparagement. Atlantic Heel Co. v. Allied Heel Co., 284 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1960)
involved a claim brought under section 1 alleging that the defendant and several individu-
als had conspired to destroy plaintiff's business. In carrying out the conspiracy the defend-
ants were alleged to have interefered with the employment relations of plaintiff, stolen
trade secrets, disparaged plaintiff and its products, instituted a suit in bad faith against
plaintiff, and interefered with plaintiff's source of raw materials. In this case, the First Cir-
cuit went so far as to say "[w]e believe that the complaint in the instant case alleges a
conspiracy to destroy a competitor by means so inimical 'to free and full flow of interstate
trade' as to constitute a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 884. But see
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975), which severely curtailed and possibly eliminated the
potential use of the per se approach in such cases.
Though the activities described above were all attacked under the proscriptions of the
Sherman Act and ultimately held to be violations of the antitrust laws, they bear a remark-
able resemblance to many activities commonly brought into question in state common law
actions for unfair competition or as they are more commonly known, "competitive torts."
See Comment, A Reexamination of Pick-Barth Per Se Illegality Under Section I of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 38 U. Prrr. L. REv. 87 (1976). "Competitive torts" include such things as
"commercial disparagement, false advertising, product imitation, interference with busi-
ness relationships, trademark and trade name infringement, misappropriation of intangible
commercial property, and wrongful establishment of a competing business." Id. at 87 n.2.
151. The Court has developed a standard for defining the relevant market: "In con-
sidering what is the relevant market for determining the control of price and competition,
no more definite rule can be declared than that commodities reasonably interchangeable
by consumers for the same purposes make up that 'part of trade or commerce' monopoliza-
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straints of trade; acts having a "de minimis" or "insignificant" ef-
fect on competition, while not punishable under the antitrust
laws, 152 would likely still be actionable under state common law.
Applying a rule-of-reason analysis to the exclusionary conduct of a
single firm would necessarily segregate conduct into one of these
two categories, 153 and thus allow a court to treat such conduct ac-
cordingly. If the evidence in a particular case revealed only injury
to plaintiff's business, without a significant anticompetitive affect
in the relevant market, the plaintiff would rightly be limited to its
common law tort claims." Thus, fear that recognition of intra-
entity conspiracy would provide treble damages "for state tort
suits masquerading as antitrust actions" 155  is completely
unfounded.
E. Form Over Substance
One final point regarding the current exclusion of single en-
tity activity from section 1 seems necessary. In Copperweld, the
Court noted that "[t]he intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine looks
to the form of an enterprise's structure and ignores the real-
ity. '15 But isn't this precisely what the intra-entity exclusion from
section 1 now does? Whether the two corporate actors in a partic-
ular case are related or unrelated will be the determining factor in
whether section 1 is applied, regardless of the substantive nature or
tion of which may be illegal." United States v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377, 395 (1956) (the Court concluded that cellophane's interchangeability with numerous
other materials suffices to make it a part of the market for flexible packaging materials).
The relevant market is defined in geographic terms as well as product terms. L. SULUVAN,
supra note 121, at 41.
152. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text. But see Note, Antitrust Treatment of
Competitive Torts, supra note 147, at 425-27 (certain competitive acts, though unfair, are
procompetitive and should not be attacked under antitrust laws for restraining
competition).
153. See infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
154. See infra text accompanying notes 162-71. Accord Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Dain,
Kalman & Quail, Inc., 578 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1979).
Where, as here, an antitrust plaintiff alleges nothing more than that a competi-
tor in interstate commerce has by means of unfair business practices deprived
plaintiff of key employees, business and confidential records or information, but
does not allege any public injury resulting from the defendant's conduct plain-
tiff must seek relief at common law and not under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 1261 (footnote omitted).
155. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2745.
156. Id. at 2743.
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effect of the conduct complained of.
As noted earlier, section 1 proscribes every conspiracy in re-
straint of trade.15 7 The Supreme Court in United States v. American
Tobacco Co.158 stated:
all the difficulties suggested by the mere form in which the assailed transac-
tions are clothed become of no moment. . .. This follows because ... [the
Sherman Act] embraced every conceivable act which could possibly come
within the spirit or purpose of the prohibitions of the law, without regard to
the garb in which such acts were clothed. 59
Yet this is essentially what both the intra-corporate, and now in-
tra-enterprise, exemptions do: make application of section 1 con-
tingent upon the corporate inter-relationship or structure of the
actors rather than upon the nature of the challenged conduct.
The law thus places the organizational form of the violators over
the substance of the acts themselves.
IV. SUGGESTED ANALYSIS
Bearing in mind that first and foremost the goal of the Sher-
man Act is to foster, preserve and protect competition in national
and international markets, 160 the question then becomes how to
best identify and evaluate the conduct of a single firm or enter-
prise which is suspected of having anticompetitive ramifications
falling within the directives of section 1. The suggested analysis
requires an initial inquiry to determine (1) if a restraint of trade is
present at all, and (2) whether the defendant's conduct had a sub-
stantially adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. If
the plaintiff satisfies this initial showing,161 then, applying a rule-
of-reason analysis, a court would evaluate the substance of the acts
in question to determine on the merits if they constitute an unrea-
sonable restraint.
157. See supra text accompanying note 41. See also supra notes 42-43 and accompany-
ing text.
158. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
159. Id. at 180-81.
160. See supra text accompanying note 39.
161. More than likely such an action will be challenged on the sufficiency of the plead-
ings and/or in a motion for summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) & 56 respectively.
Thus whether or not the party bringing the action has made a sufficient showing to allow
the action to proceed will be judged under the requirements of these rules. See id.
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A. Restraints of Trade
Nowhere in the Sherman Act is the phrase "restraint of
trade" defined; Congress left this chore to the judiciary., 2 It has
been interpreted to cover a broad range of conduct which in some
way limits or binds the free activity of the market.16 3 Moreover,
the Act does not explicitly limit who can violate section 1: it clearly
states that "every person" is subject to liability for activity in con-
travention of its provisions.'" Any such limitation, therefore, is
necessarily the result of judicial interpretation.
Where there are two or more competitors1 6 5 within a given
market, a restraint may arise in either of two ways: (1) the would-
be rivals act together to limit competition that would otherwise
exist between them, or (2) one firm becomes subject to the exclu-
sionary conduct of another."6 6 In the intra-entity context, it is
only the latter type of restraint with which we are concerned.
Thus, where a complaint alleges intra-entity conspiracy, a court's
primary focus should be on whether the conduct of a defendant
adversely affected the trade of others. 67 The true single-firm de-
fense is not concerned with conspiracy at all: it is grounded in the
proposition that, absent monopoly, restraints within the confines
of a single enterprise (e.g., internal price and distribution policies)
have no harmful effects on competition. "The crucial question is
whether the competitive prospects of market participants are re-
162. See Developments-Conspiracy, supra note 77, at 1004.
163. Restraints under section 1 have been held to include such things as horizontal
and vertical price agreements, territorial or customer allocation, group boycotts and other
refusals to deal, joint ventures, reciprocal dealing, tying arrangements and exclusive deal-
ing, see ABA supra note 17, at 1-12, as well as activity which is designed to eliminate an
existing or potential competitor from a firm's market. See Northwest Power Products, Inc.
v. Omark Industries, 576 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 1116 (1979);
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 562 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); Atlantic Heel Co. v. Allied Heel Co,, 284 F.2d
879, 884 (1st Cir. 1960).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See Comment, Has the Supreme Court Pulled the Plug, supra
note 16, at 874 n.103.
165. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
166. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 121, at 327.
167. See Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, supra note 8, at 732-34. But see Sprunk,
supra note 12, at 732-34. It is suggested that such an "external effect" theory is unwork-
able because "it is likely that every significant intra-enterprise arrangement has some exter-
nal effects." Id. at 733. Cf. ATTORNEY GFN.RaL's REPORT, supra note 38, at 34-35. (the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine is only to be invoked where conduct has "for its pur-
pose or effect coercion or unreasonable restraint on the trade of strangers").
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strained, which depends on the effect of defendant's conduct on
suppliers, customers, and competitors." l 8
It is not enough, however, for a court to determine that a
party's ability to compete is somehow improperly impaired. It
must thereafter shift its focus to the question of whether competi-
tion has been adversely affected by a defendant's activity within
the market. 6 Thus, a complaining party must establish that the
challenged acts yield significant adverse affects on competition
within the relevant market, as opposed to merely placing a plain-
tiff at a competitive disadvantage. 17 0 Where there is no viable is-
sue of fact regarding anticompetitive impact, a court should
rightly uphold the defendant's motion to dismiss.171
B. Rule of Reason
Once a court has determined that in fact a party has been
competitively restrained, and that there is a substantial likelihood
that competition has been adversely affected, the second part of
the analysis consists of applying the rule of reason.
1. Development of the Rule. Originally the Sherman Act was in-
terpreted so as to apply its literal meaning-it declared illegal all
contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade.17 1 It
soon became clear, though, that such an interpretation was not
feasible for, in reality, even legitimate, procompetitive agreements
necessarily restrain trade. 3 Thus, the Supreme Court recognized
that "some standard" was necessary to determine if the Act had
been violated.17 4 Reviewing the common law 75 existing at the
168. Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, supra note 8, at 752-34.
169. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
170. The antitrust laws are intended to protect "competition, not competitors." Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis in original). In Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) the Supreme Court noted that
plaintiffs, in order to recover under the antitrust laws, must show injury reflecting the
"anticompetitive effects" of a violation. See supra note 154.
171. See supra note 161.
172. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897).
173. See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See also National
Soc'y of Professional Engrs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) ("read literally, § 1
would outlaw the entire body of private contract law"). See also supra note 122 (Example
(2)) and accompanying text.
174. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
175. For a discussion of the common law regarding restraints of trade, see generally 1
E. KINTNER, supra note 21, at 65-76.
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time of the Sherman Act's adoption, the Court held that the stan-
dard was the "standard of reason. 1 7 6 As a result, although absent
from the explicit language of the text, section 1 of the Sherman
Act is commonly read to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of
trade.
The Supreme Court's decision in Board of Trade of Chicago v.
United States1" first identified the pertinent commercial considera-
tions to be utilized in a rule-of-reason analysis:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may supress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. This history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particu-
lar remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts.
1 78
Later, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,1 7 9 the
Court stated that under the rule of reason "the factfinder weighs
all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable re-
straint on competition. ' 18 0 A year later in National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States,""1 however, the Court sought to
limit this "all of the circumstances" test: "Contrary to its name,
the Rule does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argu-
ment in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the
realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged re-
straint's impact on competitive conditions. 1 8 2 In other words, any
analysis utilizing the rule is concerned only with the "competitive
significance" of the restraint-i.e., the "market impact" of the
conduct.18 3 Nevertheless, the "market impact" of the restraint
must represent a significant restriction on trade or competition
176. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60.
177. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
178. Id. at 238.
179. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
180. Id. at 49.
181. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
182. Id. at 688.
183. Id., at 691 & n.17 (discussing Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977)).
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within the relevant market-it must be "substantially adverse
before the Act will proscribe it."'84 Activities which have only an
insignificant or "de minimis" effect on competition are not
unlawful.18 5
In determining the degree of the restraint's effect on compe-
tition, the court may examine its impact on price, output, or prod-
uct quality,8 6 as well as the structure of the defendant's industry.
An important dimension of market structure is the number of
firms operating within the relevant market.187 Obviously, the de-
gree of competition is directly related to the number of competi-
tors within any given market. Finally, the "purpose" of a restraint
may also be relevant in a rule-of-reason analysis.' 8 The defend-
ant's intent, as inferred by a court, may provide insights to the
likely effect of such conduct on competition.
2. Application of the Rule to the Facts of the Copperweld Case. A
184. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967). The lower
courts employ similar language. See, e.g., North American Soccer League v. National Foot-
ball League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1261 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) ("substan-
tially . . . restrain competition"); Cowely v. Braden Indus., 613 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 965 (1980) (citing Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Management
Co., 553 F.2d 620, 627 (9th Cir. 1977) ("substantially adverse effect"); Sherman v. British
Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 449 (9th Cir. 1979) ("significant anticompetitive ef-
fects"). See generally E. KINTNER, supra note 2 1, at 350-62 (discussion of the rule of reason).
185. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972) (the Act was not
intended to inhibit conduct which "in some insignificant degree" restricts competition). See
also Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1981) (no "appreci-
able" anticompetitive effect); Sitkin Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440, 448
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978) (must exist as more than a "de minimis" re-
straint); H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 246 (5th Cir.
1978) (must show more than "de minimis" anticompetitive effect).
186. See, e.g., DeVoto v. Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 618 F.2d 1340, 1346 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Sithin Smelting, 575 F.2d at 447.
187. See, e.g., American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1247-
48 (3d Cir. 1975); Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1046, 1052
(N.D. Cal. 1978), affd, 694 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir.1982).
188. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, although usually in dicta, that activi-
ties which have "unreasonable restraint [as] either their object or effect" may be unlawful
under section 1. See Times-Picayune Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953). See
also McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 243 (1980); United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948). However it is not settled as to
whether anticompetitive intent, standing alone, could invoke liability under section 1. Com-
pare Fishman v. Wirtz, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64, 378, 74, 775 (N.D. I11. 1981) and
Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Shelly Oil Co., 446 F. Supp. 874, 880 (E.D. Wis. 1978), rev'd,
599 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 916 (1979) with Borger v. Yamaha Int'l
Corp., 625 F.2d 390, 397, 397 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980) and Northwest Power Prods., Inc. v.
Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
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court applying the rule to the facts of the Copperweld case'" could
plausibly reach the following results. Before the restraint was im-
posed at least one more firm was prepared to enter the market,
thus increasing the number of competitors and competition ac-
cordingly. After the restraint, Independence was delayed over
nine months in beginning its operations in the market. The actual
effect of Regal and Copperweld's conduct was to preclude Inde-
pendence's operations within Regal's industry for this period, de-
priving the marketplace of Independence's supply of goods and its
demand for raw materials and labor. Thus, it is likely this de-
crease in the level of competition would have a negative effect on
prices, output and product quality. 90
The conduct of Copperweld and Regal could easily be viewed
as serving no procompetitive purpose. Sending out letters discour-
aging other firms from dealing with Independence definitely had
anticompetitive connotations. Considering that Copperweld and
Regal were aware they had no legal right to enjoin Indepen-
dence's operation, the purpose of their actions must be seen as an
unlawful attempt to keep Independence out of the industry. 91 Al-
though discussion of the concentration of producers and the over-
all structure of Regal's market is sparse, 192 the trial court found,
and the court of appeals affirmed, that Copperweld and Regal's
189. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text. Obviously the district court and
court of appeals did utilize a rule-of-reason approach in rendering their decisions. The
following is simply an exercise, using the Copperweld facts, to illustrate how the specifics of
the rule might be applied.
190. Examination of the trial record indicates that Regal had been the "price leader"
in several of the segments serviced by its product lines. See Record at 2482-83, Copperweld.
(maintained "orderly market" for several of its products). However, when Independence
was finally able to begin operations in the market, it was able to lower prices on at least
three occasions. See id. at app. 363, 6678-79. Thus it appears that Independence's exclu-
sion from Regal's markets negatively affected at least product prices within those markets.
191. The record makes clear that, in fact, Copperweld's and Regal's concerns of los-
ing trade secrets or customer lists had no basis in fact. Id. at app. 677. It is also clear that
the specific intent of the officers involved was to keep Independence out of Regal's market.
See id. at app. 598 (letter of Phillip Smith).
192. Certain inferences as to market structure can be drawn from the record. The
existence of a price leader and the fact that Independence was able to reduce prices on at
least three occasions, see supra notes 190 & 191, indicates that prices were not determined
by a freely competitive market solution. See supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text.
Rather, it is much more likely that an oligopolistic market structure existed. However, the
fact that a claim under section 2 was not pursued suggests that Regal's market share was




conduct had a significant adverse effect on competition in the
structural steel tubing market. 193 There were independent find-
ings of "harm to Independence and harm to competition," based
on the instructions to the jury.
19 4
Clearly, then, the Supreme Court, applying the rule-of-reason
standard to the facts of the Copperweld case, could have concluded
that Copperweld's and Regal's conduct constituted an unreasona-
ble restraint of trade under section 1. Such a result would have
been true to the Sherman Act's purpose and aim of fostering, pre-
serving and protecting free competition.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has sought to demonstrate that single entity
conduct can have significant anticompetitive impact in the form of
unreasonable restraints of trade. Yet as the law stands today, such
conduct is placed beyond the reach of the Sherman Act, thereby
leaving a significant "gap" in the Act's coverage. The Supreme
Court's decision in Copperweld significantly broadens the category
of actors which fall into this exemption. By holding that, as a mat-
ter of law, affiliated corporations are always incapable of conspir-
ing in violation of section 1, the Court expands the intra-corpo-
rate exemption into the realm of affiliated corporations.
The recurring theme throughout this Comment has been a
call to abandon the current reliance on a strict, overly formalistic
interpretation of the term "conspiracy" when dealing with single
entity activity under section 1. The clear Congressional mandate
of fostering and preserving economic competition as embodied in
the Sherman Act is simply not honored by such an interpretation.
Rather, a flexible case by case analysis of the substance of chal-
lenged conduct would more appropriately promote this essential
national interest in free competition. As one commentator has
concluded, "[i]f the nature of the conduct is first looked to and a
determination made that it imposes an unreasonable restraint of
trade, it should be struck down if such can be done by a reasona-
ble construction of the enabling statutes."" 5 It has been shown
193. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 322-23 (7th Cir.
1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
194. Id. at 322.
195. Barndt, supra note 8, at 198.
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that, a "reasonable construction" of section 1 includes the notion
that officers or employees of a single corporation, as well as actors
present in affiliated corporations, can constitute the required plu-
rality necessary for a Sherman Act conspiracy.
The arguments for exempting single entity activity, as a mat-
ter of law, are not persuasive. Challenged practices which do not
appear to carry with them significant anticompetitive effect can
easily be removed from continued scrutiny under section 1. Those
acts that do appear to generate substantial antitrust injury, how-
ever, would remain subject to comprehensive examination on
their merits. Thus, decisionmaking truly internal to the firm or
enterprise would be sufficiently insulated. Moreover, relegating
antitrust plaintiffs to state law actions solely because the defend-
ants were in some way affiliated is simply not justified. The same
substantive acts should receive similar penalties. Finally, other
provisions of the antitrust laws or federal administrative laws do
not adequately deter or compensate the types of conduct discussed
herein.
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to foster a sound competi-
tive economy, thereby promoting consumer welfare. By exclud-
ing, as a matter of law, such a broad range of activity posing a real
and substantial anticompetitive threat, the present holdings frus-
trate clearly defined antitrust policy and work a grave injustice,
not only on the parties that are direct victims of such acts, but
upon all businesses and consumers ultimately affected by such
activity.
PETER J. ALESSANDRIA
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